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BEYOND THE GREAT POWERS: CHALLENGES FOR UNDERSTANDING CYBER
OPERATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA
Louise Marie Hurel

T

he past decades have been marked by a renewed
interest from states in enhancing their cyber capabilities. Responses to evolving threats have ranged
from establishing designated bodies for cybersecurity
at the national level, such as cyber commands, to sanctions and cyber diplomacy as part of the ever-expanding national cyber policy ‘toolbox’. Countries such as
the United States, the United Kingdom, and their allies have increasingly focused on questions related to
offense-defense balance as part of designing their deterrence strategies in cyberspace. Concerns around
the asymmetrical nature of cyber threats and the lower barriers of entry for non-state actors (although, at
times, state-sponsored) have equally contributed to the
emergence of concepts such as “active cyber defense,”
“defend forward,” and “persistent engagement” as synonyms to “authorized offensive cyber operations.”1 In
so doing, states believe they can shift the incentives and
heighten the costs for adversaries (e.g., China, Russia,
and North Korea) to engage in malicious activity2 while
also staging a show of force.
While important, discussions around cyber operations
and threats have largely concentrated in a handful of
countries3 – aided by structural factors that include
but are not restricted to: the concentration of media
coverage in specific countries,4 stakeholder biases in
threat reporting5, the reproduction of donor-recipient/north-south logic through cyber capacity-building
programs, among other elements.6 In addition to these
factors, discourses that seek to reinforce a “great power
rivalry”7 – so often mobilized for capturing competition
among “cyber powers”– add to the list of dynamics that
obfuscate the scope of the study of global cybersecurity
politics, in general, and Latin America, in particular.
Cybersecurity is contextual. Threat perceptions, discourses and policies do not exist in a vacuum but co-exist in different cultural, political, social and economic
contexts. While it might seem slightly trivial to remark
such a point, the great power rivalry discourse and the
over-emphasis on a small group of “power-full” countries hinders the understanding of cyber politics as
something that can unfold in other spaces/places.
The focus of this paper is not one of tracing the
above-mentioned challenges per se (as that would require multiple papers) but one of recentering Latin
America as part of the cybersecurity construct while recognizing global constraints to the interpretation and understanding of how countries beyond the great powers
conceive of cyber operations.
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This paper addresses a much less visible, but perhaps
more concerning outcome of designing great/middle
power borders: It can often overlook significant reinterpretations of what cyber operations mean domestically
as one shifts to different threat landscapes and across
varying levels of capacities (and government bodies) to
identify, assess, attribute, and respond to attacks.
To address how cyber operations and cyber norms are
conceptualized in Latin America, this paper is divided
into three parts. The first part looks at how countries
across the region have sought to devise specific mechanisms to tackle cybersecurity issues regionally and how
some have started to craft more concrete interpretations of cyber operations under international law. The
second focuses on how cyber operations are increasingly positioned in a complex association between public
security forces and intelligence activities. Finally, the
paper concludes with remarks about the consequences
and challenges the relationship between public security and cybersecurity poses to countries in the region. In
so doing, I hope the paper can challenge the borders of
what is conceived as cyber politics, who can shape cybersecurity and shed light on the existing inequalities
that permeate the literature and discussions around
cyber operations. However, I do not assume aprioristically that there is a clearly defined uniqueness to Latin
American countries’ approaches to cyber operations
and international cyber norms. Rather, I seek to refocus the discussion on both the former and the latter in
the exercise of departing from the complex reality of
cybersecurity in the region.
Who’s great? Great Power blindfold?
The release of President Biden’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance in March 2021 and other reports and interviews with White House spokespersons
indicated a new shift in vocabulary from “great power
competition” to “strategic competition” for dealing with
China and other actors.8 In practice, the proposal for a
new “strategic” narrative from the Biden administration
may be discursively less explicit about rivalry, but it is
still primarily concentrates in framing the United States
engagement with China and Russia while collaborating
with P5 and allies. As previously mentioned, while the
great powers are not the focus of this paper, I highlight
three dynamics that set the scene of contentions for the
study of concepts such as cyber operations beyond the
“great powers” and thus paving the way for situating
Latin American countries in this landscape.
First, the great power construct often incurs in an
over-simplification of state-state relations in which
private companies have considerable power over the
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governance of networked infrastructures and the production of knowledge about threats.9 The ransomware attacks promoted by the Russian group Darkside
against the state-owned Brazilian energy supplier Copel10 and, most notoriously, Colonial Pipeline,11 provide
examples of the pervasive private oversight over critical infrastructure.
Second, it restricts the scope of which countries’ agendas
matter in the making and shaping of cybersecurity—and
which terms and institutional models are more desirable for conducting cyber operations.12 With the United
States, United Kingdom, European Union, China, and
Russia as key players, one can often miss the specificities
of how cyber operations and cyber norms are conceptualized and approached in other institutional contexts,
more specifically, in Latin America.
Third, it positions countries beyond the great powers
as either key adversaries or as “others,” “secondary
states,” “developing states,” “swing states,”13 or “middle powers.”14 In this regard, such narratives can contribute to the fixing of a central position against which
other countries are measured.15 Such measurement can
be identified more explicitly through the development of
metrics to assess a country’s maturity or cyber power,16
and subjectively through discourses that seek to contrast
authoritarian and democratic approaches.
In light of these challenges, the following section unpacks the role of regional bodies in attempting to build
a common vision for tackling cybersecurity threats and
Latin American countries’ evolving position in the applicability of international law in cyberspace.

From regional developments to countries
views on international cyber norms
For nearly two decades, the Organization of American
States (OAS) has been a key player in promoting cybersecurity capacities in the region through technical
trainings and dialogues and has become an important locus for member states to discuss cybersecurity-related issues at the regional level. In 2003, only
two months after the adoption of the United Nations
(UN) General Assembly resolution on the “Creation of
a global culture of cybersecurity,” the OAS published
the “Declaración sobre Seguridad de las Américas,” in
which states recognize the need to adapt to a shifting
threat landscape by establishing a multidimensional
vision for hemispheric security. The declaration made
explicit member states’ commitment to identifying
and combating “emerging threats” such as cybersecurity, biological terrorism, and threats to critical
infrastructure.17 The document also noted that states
VOLUME 2 | JANUARY 2022

would develop a cybersecurity culture in the Americas
by adopting measures for “preventing, treating, and
responding to cyberattacks … combating cyber threats
and cybercrime, typifying attacks against cyberspace,
protecting critical infrastructure and protecting networked systems.”18
While the 2003 Declaration was a critical step in setting a regional security vision that went beyond traditional threats and recognized the state was not the sole
actor in providing security, the 2004 “Inter-American
Strategy to combat threats to cybersecurity” further
consolidated cybercrime and cybersecurity as an integral part of the hemispheric agenda. Since then, the
agenda19 has been operationalized through the work of
the Inter-American Telecommunication Commission,
the OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism
(OAS-CICTE), and the Meetings of Ministers of Justices, other Ministers, Prosecutors and Attorneys General of the Americas.20
In 2017 the OAS established, within CICTE, the Working Group on Co-operation and Confidence-Building
Measures in Cyberspace (CBM). Member states have
incrementally added new CBMs to the list. 21 These
include, but are not restricted to, nominating points
of contact at the policy level capable of discussing
the implications of hemispheric cyber threats 22 and
strengthening cyber capacity building through activities such as seminars, conferences, and workshops
for both public and private sector officials in cyber
diplomacy.
Despite the continuous regional efforts to deepen
member state cooperation in cybersecurity and enhance cyber capacity building, when it comes to cyber operations, Latin American countries are still
developing their own understanding of the topic.
The fifth report of the Inter-American Judicial Committee (IACJ) on International Law and State Cyber
Operations provides some insights into the present
positions and gaps in defining cyber operations. The
objective of the report was to improve “transparency with respect to how member states understand
the application of international law to State cyber
operations.”23 According to Duncan Hollis, the group
rapporteur, states’ legal capacities are uneven in this
area. As he notes, “Some States evinced deep knowledge of cyber operations and the novel international legal issues they raise while others demonstrated
much less familiarity with the underlying international legal rules and the particular questions their applications generate in the cyber context.”24 In addition,
out of 35 OAS member states, only seven responded to
the IACJ questionnaire.25
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However, other forums, such as the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) and the Open-Ended
Working Group (OEWG)—all of which are part of the
UN First Committee—pushed many member states to
publish their views on the applicability of international
law in cyberspace and their interpretation of what could
be some of the “redlines” in the context of a cyberattack.
As the table below shows, while many countries have
not published an official document or developed views
on state cyber operations and international law, they
have provided some indications in OEWG speeches and
interventions. The table presents excerpts from publicly
available documents submitted by delegations in the occasion of the UNOEWG and the UNGGE.

Table: Latin American countries that published their views on cyber operations
(emphasis added by the author)
Country

Source

Declaration (extracted from documents/speeches)

Brazil

Comment on Initial PreEmphasis on electoral interference
Draft of the OEWG Report “Brazil attaches fundamental importance to the need for adequate
(2020)
protection against threats to critical infrastructure, especially
electrical, water and sanitation systems (paragraph 19). Electoral
processes are also vulnerable to illegitimate interference through
the malicious use of ICTs [Information and Communications
Technology], and they should also be considered an essential
component of the critical infrastructure of states.”
Comment on Zero Draft of “Brazil has a few specific text suggestions, especially in the section
the OEWG Report (2021)
of international law, in which conceptual rigor is of utmost relevance. We will present our comments on each section as the debate
evolves. We will also be glad to share with the chair`s team our
specific comments to the text in written form.”
UNGGE Official
Compendium (2021)

Principle of sovereignty

“Interceptions of telecommunications, for instance, whether
or not they are considered to have crossed the threshold of
an intervention in the internal affairs of another State, would
nevertheless be considered an internationally wrongful act
because they violate state sovereignty. Similarly, cyber operations
against information systems located in another State’s territory or
causing extraterritorial effects might also constitute a breach of
sovereignty.”

Use of force

The United Nations Charter does not refer to specific weapons or
other means of use of force, and therefore the legal prohibition
applies to all of them. Cyber operations may amount to an illegal
use of force if they are attributable to a State and if their impact is
similar to the impact of a kinetic attack.
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Brazil

UNGGE Official
Compendium (2021)

Use of force—Recommendation on classification of
cyberattacks to aid in interpretation of use of force
and aggression.
“Although it is not binding, GA Res 3314(XXIX) has been
considered highly authoritative and has guided the ICJ in its
caselaw.3314 (XXIX) and cyber operations, due to their unique
characteristics. Therefore, it is advisable to update the multilateral
understanding of which acts amount to the use of force and
aggression, so as to include instances of cyberattacks. In many
instances, it might prove difficult to establish a direct analogy
between the acts listed in GA Res.”

State Responsibility - Attribution

[C]yber operations are attributable to a State if they are conducted
by a state organ, by persons or entities exercising elements of
governmental authority, or by persons or groups “acting on the
instructions of, or under the direction or control of,” the State.
Regarding the latter criteria, for a private person or entity’s conduct
to be attributable to a State, it has to be proved that the state had
“effective control” over the operations. It is clear, therefore, that
a connection “must exist between the conduct of a [state] and its
international responsibility.”
Chile

Comment on Initial
Pre-Draft of the OEWG
Report (2020)

Applicability of international law (IL), peaceful
settlement of disputes, non-intervention.

“De la misma forma destacamos y apoyamos las menciones hechas
respecto a que el derecho internacional y en particular a la Carta de
las Naciones Unidas, es aplicable y esencial para mantener la paz y la
estabilidad y promover un entorno de TICs abierto, seguro, estable,
accesible y pacífico. También valoramos la mención a principios
específicos de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, en particular la
solución pacifica de controversias, la prohibición de recurrir a
la amenaza o al uso de la fuerza contra la integridad territorial o
independencia política de cualquier Estado, la no-intervención en
los asuntos internos de otros Estados, y el respeto por los derechos
humanos y las libertades fundamentales.”

Self-defense

“Por ejemplo, Chile considera legítimo la aplicación del principio de
la auto-defensa en virtud del Articulo 51 de la Carta de las Naciones
Unidas, si bien entiende que otros Estados discrepan.”
Comment on Zero Draft of --- (no mention of International Law or cyber operations) --the OEWG Report (2021)
Colombia

Comment on Initial
Pre-Draft of the OEWG
Report (2020)
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Applicability of International Law

“Colombia considers that general provisions and principles of
international law could also apply to cyberspace and, at the
moment, does not foresee the need to initiate negotiations for a
new legally binding instrument on the subject.”
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Colombia

Comment on Initial
Pre-Draft of the OEWG
Report (2020)

Attribution

“[D]iscussions regarding attribution of cyber-attacks at the UN level
are welcome, in order to increase accountability for malicious cyber
activities, and to determine the international responsibility of the
States for their internationally wrongful acts in the use of ICTs.”

Self-Defense

“The inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as
recognized in the Charter of the United Nations is essential to
maintaining peace and stability in the ICT environment, as it was
confirmed by the 2015 GGE report.”

Sovereignty

“State Sovereignty must not be used as a pretext to violate human
rights and freedoms or tighten control over citizens. It is essential
to maintain an open, secure, stable, accessible, and peaceful ICTs
environment.”

Regional collaboration

“Colombia supports the recommendation on enhancing the coordination with regional organizations, in order to exchange experiences at the UN level, on the development and operationalization of the confidence building measures and capacity building
efforts.”
Comment on Zero Draft of Applicability of International Law
the OEWG Report (2021)
“We highlight the importance of having the reference to the
applicability of the existing international law in cyberspace,
specifically of the United Nations Charter, as well as of leaving the
door open for future dialogues related to its interpretation and
application forms. The reference to the neutral and objective efforts
for building capacities in this regard is fundamental.“

Targets

“[M]y delegation celebrates the reference to the importance of the
protection of critical infrastructure, which should include medical
and healthcare facilities.”
Mexico

Comment on Initial
Pre-Draft of the OEWG
Report (2020)

“The list of existing and emerging threats should also include the
issues of hate speech and intrusive software, which were widely
highlighted by Member States and stakeholders alike.”

Uruguay

Comment on Initial
Pre-Draft of the OEWG
Report (2020)

Sovereignty

“[T]he sovereignty of each State in the decisions to be taken and
implemented in the future, as well as the guiding principles of the
international law, must be respected without exception.”

Human Rights

“The application of Human Rights norms in Cyberspace and for the
use of information and communication technologies, especially the
right to freedom of expression and online privacy, constitutes the
pillars that the States must not ignore, but rather must guarantee
and promote.”
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Uruguay

Comment on Initial
Pre-Draft of the OEWG
Report (2020)

Non-intervention / neutrality

Venezuela

Comment on Initial
Pre-Draft of the OEWG
Report (2020)

Applicability of International Law

“Uruguay does not carry out or support activities that may damage
the informational systems of the incident response centers in other
States. It also does not carry out activities that seek to attack other
centers from the CertUy.”
“Venezuela reiterates that the use of ICTs must be fully consistent with
the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law,
in particular the principles of sovereign equality, peaceful settlement
of international disputes, refraining in international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, and non-intervention in the internal
affairs of other States.”
[O]ur delegation recommends to avoid the mention made in
paragraph three to the military use of cyberspace, and to abstain from
making references to the application of international humanitarian
law in this context, as said branch of international law is exclusive to
armed conflict, as reflected in paragraphs 24 and 25.
Inclusion of shared response and interpretations of violations
Venezuela considers that this document should include a reference
to the role of digital platforms, companies and States in assuring
a responsible behavior that could prevent actions and/or attacks
against the territories and critical infrastructure of other States, with a
view to avoid the misuse of ICT’s for hostile propaganda; interference
in the internal affairs of States; violating the national sovereignty,
security, public order and health systems of States; discriminatory
treatment of information contents and/or disinformation; misuse
for criminal and terrorist purposes.

Beyond malicious use of ICT

“The document should also contemplate a reference to the monopoly
in internet governance, anonymity of persons, and aggressive cyber
strategies which clearly affect the capacities of States.”
“Venezuela would like to see reflected a clear condemnation of
the militarization of cyberspace and the covert and illegal use of
computer systems to attack other States, as well as the proliferation
of cybercrime and cyberterrorism, and an acknowledgement that
further efforts are needed to promote an open, secure, stable and
peaceful cyberspace from which all States can benefit, as well as
effective and urgent measures, within the framework of international
cooperation, to counter, by peaceful means, existing threats.”
Comment on Zero Draft of “Matters such as those relating to the automatic application of the UN
the OEWG Report (2021)
Charter and the international responsibility of States for illegal acts
in relation to the field of information and telecommunications in the
context of international security lack consensus and could therefore
be addressed in the text in a manner that effectively responds to the
particularities and sensibilities of all Member States.”
(Source: GGE26/OEWG)
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As the table above shows, six countries from the region
have published their statements on responsible state behavior in cyberspace in either the UNGGE or UNOEWG.
In September 2021, Brazil was the only country in Latin
America to have published an official document on these
matters. While not all papers/speeches explicitly mention
cyber operations, they provide some initial indicators regarding what could be considered a threat or risk to national cyber stability, including interference in electoral
infrastructure (Brazil), attacks on human rights (Uruguay
and Colombia), and the absence of a vision for a shared
responsibility of malicious ICT acts (Venezuela).
Brazil’s position paper provides more in-depth considerations of what would be understood as a cyber operation
under the principle of the use of force. Brazil notes that
“cyber operations may amount to an illegal use of force if
they are attributable to a State and if their impact is similar to the impact of a kinetic attack.”27 Thus, the identification of a cyber operation is directly related to at least
two criteria: first, a malicious attack that could fall under
International Law includes those perpetrated by a state
or a non-state actor. For a non-state actor to be associated with a state, “it has to be proved that the State had
“effective control” over the operations.”28 In other words,
the group or individuals involved should have been acting
under the instructions or control of the state. However,
many questions remain as to what kind of evidence would
configure enough effective control to attribute state-sponsored hacking to a group. Second, Brazil highlights that
a cyber operation is measured and understood not only
in relation to the actor (attribution) but the intensity of
its impact (“similar to the impact of a kinetic attack”),
a position that has been shared by other states. Despite
the country’s public position, it is still unclear what circumstances would potentially trigger political attribution
from Brazil and whether the government would consider
– as others have done29 – a more detailed distinction between ‘scale’ and ‘effects’ of the attack.
Countries in Latin America have been gradually developing their views on state cyber operations. However, the
discussions around the applicability of international law
in cyberspace represent only one dimension of a more
complex landscape of defining cyber operations. In the
case of international law, cyber operations are measured
in relation to how and when they might trigger international law (attacks), what can be learned from customary
international law, and how specific principles and protections under IL can support greater stability in the international system, and among other considerations. But what
happens to all the activities below the threshold? How
are they approached by countries in Latin America, and
which bodies are responsible for responding?

VOLUME 2 | JANUARY 2022

The blurry (and dangerous) lines: cybersecurity and cybercrime in Latin America
For decades, cybercrime has been one of the main challenges facing countries in the region.30 From the theft of
financial data to cyber drug cartels, the threat landscape
in Latin America combines the emergence of increasingly complex cyberattacks directed toward government bodies with the consolidation of organized crime
online.31 Financially motivated threats and ransomware
attacks have become more sophisticated. If groups such
as Anonymous were using distributed denial-of-service
attacks in 2012 to take down websites from banking institutions in Brazil, the landscape in 2021 is much more
complex.
In 2020, the North Korean group “BeagleBoyz” conducted a global campaign using remote access malware
to steal data from financial institutions. Targeted countries in Latin America included Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica,
Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Ecuador.32 However, the attribution of BeagleBoyz as a state-sponsored
group gained notoriety after the U.S. government issued
a joint alert33 on the group, associating it with Advanced
Personal Threat 38:
The BeagleBoyz overlap to varying degrees with
groups tracked by the cybersecurity industry as
Lazarus, Advanced Persistent Threat 38 (APT38),
Bluenoroff, and Stardust Chollima and are responsible for the FASTCash ATM cash outs reported in
October 2018, fraudulent abuse of compromised
bank-operated SWIFT system endpoints since at
least 2015, and lucrative cryptocurrency thefts.
This illicit behavior has been identified by the United Nations (UN) DPRK Panel of Experts as evasion
of UN Security Council resolutions, as it generates
substantial revenue for North Korea. North Korea
can use these funds for its UN-prohibited nuclear
weapons and ballistic missile programs. Additionally, this activity poses significant operational risk
to the Financial Services sector and erodes the integrity of the financial system.
Even though multiple Latin American countries were
targeted, attribution was reportedly done by different
bodies of the U.S. government—with incident responders in the region replicating the notification issued by
the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
(CISA).34 Most countries in the region engage in attribution through public security bodies, such as the police,
rather than political attribution of cyberattacks. Even so,
it is important to note that although the latter can often
be sparse, it does not mean it is non-existent. This was
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the case in the aftermath of the Edward Snowden documents, when it was revealed that the United States had
spied on President Dilma Rousseff and other important
political leaders and Brazil openly called out the US for
its cyber espionage.35 Venezuela, on the other hand, has
included cyber attribution as a growing part of their political strategy. Examples include the attribution of a
major power outage in 2019 and an attack against the
Bank of Venezuela – that left it offline for five days in
2021 – to the United States.36
Yet, even in the case of other notorious incidents, Latin American countries have often responded with a
criminal approach37 as the primary avenue for attribution and response. Governments across the region
have been investing heavily in new programs for police
forces and equipping them with tools for conducting
forensic activities. Mexico, for example, launched a
24/7 network for cybercrime in 2017 and established a
model for cybercrime police forces.38 Other countries,
like Brazil, also have a national network of cybercrime
police stations.39 The police have been working with
other public security bodies, such as the Office of Integrated Operations (SEOPI) of the Ministry of Justice
and Public Security on operational intelligence to investigate and respond to cyberattacks.40 Even so, the
development of institutional mechanisms dedicated to
cybercrime has been followed by an increased acquisition of investigatory software and tools—often with
little transparency regarding the purpose and continuity of the use of a specific tool. In the case of Brazil, a
public call from the SEOPI for open-source software in
May 2021 became a national conundrum when the bid
received a proposal from the Israeli technology firm,
NSO Group Technologies.
In early July 2021, multiple organizations such as Amnesty International, The Guardian, Forbidden Stories,
and other media organizations came together to release the results of a months-long investigation into the
use of the NSO Group Technologies’ spyware solution,
Pegasus.41 Countries in Latin America, such as Mexico,
had reportedly been using the spyware technology for
more than a decade at the cost of over US$160 million
to target groups.42
This emphasis on cybercrime has potential implications
for understanding cyber operations as an integral part
of criminal prosecution, technical attribution, and digital forensics activities. While the incipient discussion (or
lack of one) on cyber operations at the regional level is
partly tied to a lack of capacities or a mismatch of focal points at the national and regional levels, it can also
serve as a smoke screen for Latin American countries to
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continue developing their cyber capabilities with little to
no oversight. The blurriness between police forces and
other public security bodies can (and has) posed challenges to accountability over software acquisitions. This
is particularly worrying as it raises important questions
over states’ purchasing power of cyber weapons with a
risk of little public oversight.

Conclusion
This paper sought to address how cyber operations
and cyber norms are conceptualized in Latin America.
To do so, regional and national developments in this
field were reviewed, along with the involvement of
countries in Latin America in international processes
(UNGGE/OEWG).
The OAS continues to play an essential role in building
cyber capacities in the region. However, as the IACJ
report indicates, member states’ views are still a patchwork of understandings about responsible state behavior in cyberspace and the role of cyber operations. One
IACJ state representative called for “developing a distinctly Latin American perspective on the international
governance and legal framework of cyberspace”43 that
would—instead of duplicating efforts—build on previous experiences (UNGGE and OEWG) to “develop a Latin American framework for understanding international
law in cyberspace based on a shared political culture of
democratic institutions and Ibero-American history.”
Comments such as this indicate some resistance to the
great power rivalry and propose a complementary but
Latin American interpretation of IL. 44
However, as the paper highlighted, while Latin American countries face challenges in defining state cyber operations from an international law perspective. A more
practice-oriented view of cyber operations indicates
that some of their activities concentrate on the realm of
cybercrime. Cyber operations, in its broader and practice-based sense, rely on concentrating capabilities in
police forces and other public security bodies associated
with law enforcement. This complex scenario points to
a worrying landscape in which police forces and public
security bodies can overextend their scope of activities
through the acquisition of surveillance tools and other
malicious solutions.
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